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EXPLORING THE AGENCY CONSEQUENCES OF 
OWNERSHIP DISPERSION AMONG THE DIRECTORS 
OF PRIVATE FAMILY FIRMS 
WILLIAM S. SCHULZE 
Case Western Reserve University 
MICHAEL H. LUBATKIN 
University of Connecticut and Ecole de Management de Lyon 
RICHARD N. DINO 
University of Connecticut 
Using an agency-theoretic lens and insights drawn from the behavioral economics and 
family business literatures, we developed hypotheses concerning the effect of disper- 
sion of ownership on the use of debt by private family-owned and family-managed 
firms. A field study of 1,464 family firms was conducted. Results suggest that, during 
periods of market growth, the relationship between the use of debt and the dispersion 
of ownership among directors at family firms can be graphed as a U-shaped curve. 
The principal-agent model has had a profound 
influence on corporate governance theory (Jensen, 
1998). A central premise of this theory is that man- 
agement decisions are strongly influenced by the 
ownership status of each decision maker who 
serves on a corporation's board of directors. The 
agency positions of outside owners and owner- 
managers differ. Outside owners prefer growth- 
oriented risk taking because they benefit solely 
from the appreciation of shareholder value. They 
are also indifferent to the level of risk that is spe- 
cific to any particular investment made by a given 
firm because they can reduce that risk by holding 
diversified portfolios. Owners who manage a pri- 
vate firm, in contrast, define its value in terms of 
utility, and so they will undertake risks that are 
commensurate with their preferences for certain 
outcomes. These outcomes not only include finan- 
cial and nonfinancial benefits, but also include the 
utility generated by the ability to exercise author- 
ity, dictate strategy, and choose which investments 
the firm will undertake. 
Should an owner-manager relinquish equity to 
outside owners, the agency theory prediction is 
that changes in the incentives facing the owner- 
manager will cause the firm's value to decline. 
Specifically, because inside owners would now 
bear only a fraction of the cost of the benefits they 
receive, they have incentive to act opportunisti- 
cally and make decisions that promote their self- 
regarding interests as opposed to the interests of 
outside shareholders (Demsetz, 1973; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983a). In this 
way, fractional ownership creates agency prob- 
lems: it gives inside owners incentive to free ride 
on outside owners' equity and to favor consump- 
tion over investment. 
But what if there are no outside shareholders and 
firm equity is instead distributed among family 
members? Will fractional ownership create agency 
problems, as the conventional agency model 
implies, or do family relationships promote the 
within-group alignment of ownership interests and 
encourage investment? This and other questions 
about the governance of private family firms has 
been largely glossed over in the management liter- 
ature, yet family firms account for 40 to 60 percent 
of U.S. gross national product and employ upwards 
of 80 percent of the workforce (Gomez-Mejia, 
Nufiez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001). Answers to these 
questions can enrich corporate governance theory, 
which heretofore has focused primarily on public 
firms and the challenge of aligning insider goals 
with those of outside investors (Morck, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1988; Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 
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1996), while overlooking private firms and the chal- 
lenge of achieving within-group goal alignment. 
In this study, we examine how ownership dis- 
persion among family directors influences a firm's 
use of debt in 1,464 medium-sized, private, family- 
owned and 
-managed firms; the average firm in our 
sample had annual sales of $36 million, had 182 
employees, and had been in business for 49 years. 
Our thesis is that both market conditions and the 
dispersion of ownership influence the agency po- 
sition of individual directors in such a way that 
they are more willing to use debt and bear the 
attendant risk it poses to their individual wealth 
when (1) market growth rates are high and (2) con- 
trol rests in the hands of a controlling owner or 
with a coalition of minority shareholders, rather 
than being more equally dispersed. Consistent with 
our hypotheses, our finding is that the relationship 
between a family firm's use of debt and the disper- 
sion of ownership among its directors forms a U- 
shaped function when market growth is high, but 
not when market growth is low. 
GOVERNANCE EFFICIENCIES IN THE 
FAMILY FIRM 
Agency costs arise whenever ownership and con- 
trol are separated. Agency theorists, beginning with 
Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1985), have long pre- 
sumed that family governance minimizes these 
costs. For example, the need to monitor family 
agent conduct is reduced because familiarity and 
the intimate knowledge gained from long associa- 
tion facilitate communication and promote cooper- 
ation among family owners and family agents. 
Fama and Jensen noted that "family members have 
many dimensions of exchange with one another 
over a long horizon that lead to advantages in mon- 
itoring and disciplining family-related decision 
agents" (1983b: 306). The need to incur bonding 
costs is also reduced because family ties link them 
to a kinship network that is characterized by norms 
of reciprocity, strong social ties, a shared identity, 
and a common history (Ouchi, 1980). Kinship 
thus tempers self-interest-and the conflict it can 
cause-by fostering loyalty and commitment to the 
family and the firm. 
Self-interest is further tempered by parental al- 
truism. This trait, which economists model as a 
utility function in which the welfare of individuals 
is positively linked to the welfare of others (Becker, 
1981; Lunati, 1997), compels parents to be gener- 
ous to their children. It also encourages family 
members to be considerate of one another and to 
care for each other in time of need, even to the 
point of sacrifice. The result, Fama and Jensen con- 
cluded, is that "special relations with other deci- 
sion agents allow agency problems to be controlled 
without separation of the management and control 
decisions" (1983b: 306). 
Altruism and kinship offset some of the ineffi- 
ciencies in risk bearing that otherwise accompany 
private ownership. All else being the same, private 
ownership limits access to capital, forcing a pri- 
vate, family-owned and -managed firm to rely on 
internal sources to fund investments. The fact that 
most of their wealth is invested in the firm also 
tends to make private firm owners reluctant to use 
debt. Should the owners be linked to the same 
kinship network, however, their individual calcu- 
lus for framing investment decisions changes. Spe- 
cifically, altruism and kinship can make them more 
willing to use debt and bear the threat it poses to 
their individual wealth, because they temper their 
self-interest with concern for the welfare of the 
family and firm. Altruism and kinship thus make 
family directors more willing to use debt to fund 
investment and pursue growth than agency theo- 
rists would predict, especially when market condi- 
tions are promising. The assumption that owner- 
ship will remain within the family also gives family 
directors incentive to make investments that will 
benefit the next generation of owners. This long- 
term perspective, combined with the type of deep 
knowledge that family directors acquire from life- 
long involvement in the principal industry of their 
family firm, makes them better able to evaluate risk 
and make strategic investments (Kang, 1999). 
It is tempting to conclude that family ownership 
and management naturally minimize agency costs 
while giving family directors the incentive to make 
investment decisions that serve the best interests of 
a firm and family. However, this positive portrait is 
at odds with evidence suggesting that these firms 
are "plagued by conflicts" that can cause them to 
flounder, if not fail (Levinson, 1971: 90) and that 
they are vulnerable to a form of inertia that can 
paralyze decision making and threaten firm sur- 
vival (Meyer & Zucker, 1989). 
This positive portrait is also at odds with the 
recent study by Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buch- 
holtz (2001), who found indirect support for the 
thesis that altruism has a dark side. Although it can 
temper self-interest and engender loyalty, commit- 
ment, and a long-term perspective, altruism can 
also alter the incentive structure of a firm so that 
some of the agency benefits gained are offset by free 
riding and other agency problems. For example, 
altruism can create a sense of entitlement among 
family members by encouraging CEOs (usually a 
parent and/or head of household of the controlling 
family) to use the firm's resources to provide family 
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members with employment, perquisites, and priv- 
ileges that they would not otherwise receive. Altru- 
ism can also bias CEOs' perceptions of their em- 
ployed children, which hampers their ability to 
monitor and discipline them. The result, Schulze 
and colleagues concluded, is that family-owner 
management does not necessarily minimize the 
agency cost of fractional ownership and, in some 
cases, can exacerbate it. 
We expand this argument in the following sec- 
tions. Our thesis is that just as the separation of 
ownership from control in widely held firms drives 
a wedge between the interests of principal and 
agent, the dispersion of ownership in family-held 
firms drives a wedge between the interests of those 
who lead a firm-and often own a controlling in- 
terest-and other family owners. We begin by pro- 
posing that, contrary to the tenets of agency theory, 
inside ownership and board oversight do not effi- 
ciently resolve the agency problems experienced by 
private, family-owned and -managed firms. Draw- 
ing on behavioral economics theory, we then ex- 
plain how private ownership and family manage- 
ment can combine to raise the agency costs of 
fractional ownership, and thereby influence family 
director conduct and a firm's use of debt. 
THE GOVERNANCE EFFECTS OF PRIVATE 
OWNERSHIP AND FAMILY MANAGEMENT 
According to the principal-agent model, inside 
ownership and board oversight efficiently resolve 
the conflicts caused by fractional ownership be- 
cause: (1) ownership aligns inside owners' risk 
preferences with those of outsiders while increas- 
ing communication and cooperation among them; 
(2) liquid markets limit the cost of board conflict by 
making it possible for disputing parties to buy or 
sell shares at a market-determined price; and (3) 
voting generates economically efficient outcomes 
since it reflects the proportionate distribution of 
risk and reward among a firm's owners (e.g., Al- 
chian & Woodward, 1988; Fama & Jensen, 1983a; 
Jensen, 1998; Jensen & Smith, 1985). We argue in 
this section that none of these three governance 
mechanisms operates as theorized when firms are 
privately owned and family managed. 
First, the agency theory assumption that in- 
creased inside ownership aligns owner preferences 
implies that individuals are economically rational 
wealth maximizers. In contrast, behavioral econo- 
mists, like O'Donoghue and Rabin (2000) and 
Thaler and Shefrin (1981), have argued that indi- 
viduals are motivated by an idiosyncratic set of 
preferences-some economic and some noneco- 
nomic in character, and some self-regarding (egois- 
tic) and some other-regarding (altruistic)-and are 
driven to maximize the utility they gain from each. 
Taken together, these assertions suggest that goal 
alignment within any board would be difficult to 
attain and sustain. Further, they suggest that con- 
flicts of interest arise because resource constraints 
prevent board members from maximizing their dif- 
ferent types of preferences simultaneously. For ex- 
ample, actions taken to promote wealth can prevent 
actions taken to promote leisure, while actions mo- 
tivated by self-interest can prevent actions taken to 
promote the welfare of others. 
Unlike public firms, which can rely on external 
governance mechanisms to minimize the adverse 
effects of these internal conflicts, family firms can- 
not do so because private ownership isolates them 
from the discipline that external markets provide. 
Moreover, altruism hampers the ability of a family 
firm's principal owner (who is usually the CEO) to 
use internal governance mechanisms like monitor- 
ing to minimize internal conflicts and the agency 
threats they engender (Schulze et al., 2001). Field 
study findings concur: family-firm CEOs tend to 
rely on informal monitoring and control mecha- 
nisms (Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Geeraerts, 1984) 
and are notorious for avoiding disciplinary issues 
that might have repercussions for familial relations 
both inside and outside the firms (Meyer & Zucker, 
1989; Ward, 1987). In sum, whereas the agency 
theory assumption is that ownership and monitor- 
ing efficiently align shareholder interests in public 
firms, behavioral economic perspectives suggest 
that ownership can have the opposite effect when 
firms are private and family-managed. 
Second, agency theory also suggests that market 
liquidity, and hence the ability to exit a firm at low 
cost, limit the potential cost of settling conflicts of 
interests among the directors of public firms, be- 
cause those who disagree with the majority opinion 
can simply sell their shares at the current market 
price and exit the firm. Of course, this claim rests 
on the assumption that the only transaction cost 
that matters is the cost of selling equity. Behavioral 
agency theorists, like Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 
(1998), would take exception to this statement. Ac- 
cording to their theory, which melds insights from 
prospect theory with agency theory, insiders face a 
number of noneconomic exit costs, including the 
value of the firm-specific knowledge, experience, 
and social networks that they accumulated while 
employed in the firm's upper-management ranks, 
as well as the emotional costs associated with a 
change in status, the possible relocation of the fam- 
ily, and so on. 
Family-member inside directors arguably face 
higher exit costs. There are no liquid markets for 
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their stock. Even if there were, exiting the firm 
would still mean forgoing certain rights, perqui- 
sites, and other privileges that generally come with 
being employed by one's family (Schulze et al., 
2001). Moreover, exiting might not only entail for- 
going (or at least reducing) the share one expects to 
inherit in the firm and/or the family's estate, but 
also forgoing or reducing benefits that might accrue 
from continued close association with the firm and 
family (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfian, & Rosen, 1993). Fi- 
nally, and perhaps most importantly, leaving a fam- 
ily firm entails significant emotional costs associ- 
ated with lost intimacy, reduced status, breaking 
familial expectations and, in some cases, a severing 
of family ties (Gersick, Davis, Hampton, & Lans- 
berg, 1997). 
Thus, if market liquidity (along with monitoring 
and voting) is necessary for an efficient resolution 
of conflicts among members of a board of directors, 
then higher exit costs should make board conflict 
resolution more costly in family firms. High exit 
costs, therefore, tend to lock insider directors into a 
firm, thereby making the conflicts that arise more 
persistent and a convergence of interests more dif- 
ficult to achieve. Thus, we again infer that a differ- 
ent set of incentives is at play among inside family 
directors (those who are both directors and employ- 
ees), a situation that affects board conduct in ways 
that extant agency models do not predict. 
Finally, agency theorists assert that although in- 
side and outside owners of public firms may have 
differences that defy consensus, voting assures that 
the preferences of the risk-neutral majority will 
prevail. Of course, this assertion relies on the as- 
sumption that board members carry out their fidu- 
ciary responsibilities and that the independence of 
outsiders is not compromised by the influence of 
insiders. This is not always the case (e.g., Finkel- 
stein & Hambrick, 1996). CEOs, by virtue of their 
professional and political ties as well as the author- 
ity of their office, can make both inside and (some) 
outside directors beholden to them (Kroll, Wright, 
& Theerathorn, 1993). Also, the boards of some 
firms, especially those with widely distributed 
ownership and without large-block owners, may 
appoint outsiders who are not vigilant in monitor- 
ing and/or fail to exercise their fiduciary authority 
over insiders (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Thus, en- 
trenchment threatens the autonomy of such a board 
and undermines the effectiveness of its oversight. 
Family firms are particularly vulnerable to voting 
imperfections and entrenchment. The CEO of a 
family firm generally wields power that is dis- 
proportionate to his or her share of ownership; 
this disproportionate power stems from familial 
sources (for instance, status as the head of the fam- 
ily), hierarchical sources (such as status as the head 
of the firm), and (because the firm is privately held) 
freedom from the oversight and discipline pro- 
vided by the market for corporate control and other 
sources of external governance. Not surprisingly, 
family-firm CEOs tend to be entrenched; their av- 
erage tenure of 24 years (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983) is 
twice that observed in widely held firms (Hambrick 
& Fukutomi, 1991: 736). Further, family firms tend 
to have small boards of directors (there was an 
average of four members per board in the sample 
used in this study, whereas experts recommend 
seven or more), and they tend to appoint directors 
who are friends of the CEO and/or happen to have 
a fiduciary relationship with the firm (such as their 
attorneys and accountants), further compromising 
director autonomy and board vigilance (Ford, 1988; 
Gersick et al., 1997; Nash, 1988; Ward & Handy, 
1988). 
In sum, the combined influence of private own- 
ership and family management results in a web of 
incentives that undermine a family firm's gover- 
nance and raise the agency cost of fractional own- 
ership. In the next section, we explain how owner- 
ship dispersion influences director conduct and 
family firms' use of debt. 
THE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP DISPERSION 
AT FAMILY FIRMS 
Whereas the boards of public firms consist of 
inside and outside directors, a family firm's board 
consists of a principal owner (who is usually, but 
not always, the founder and CEO) and minority 
shareholders (who tend to be members of the nu- 
clear and/or extended family and are often, but not 
always, employed by the firm). Family-firm owner- 
ship tends to get dispersed in a somewhat episodic 
and "stepwise" fashion over a relatively long pe- 
riod of time, with shares usually passed from 
parent to child around the time of the principal 
owner's retirement and/or death. 
While patterns of ownership dispersion vary, 
ranging from primogeniture (in which leadership 
and control of the voting stock passes to the first- 
born) to coparcenary (in which offspring receive 
relatively equal shares), the tendency in the United 
States is to grant the most shares to the chief exec- 
utive, and more shares to offspring who are em- 
ployed by the firm than to those who are not. (Test- 
ing for confirmation, we found the first tendency 
held true in all the cases in which we could iden- 
tify the occupation of a firm's principal share- 
holder, and the second tendency held true for the 
preponderance of the 1,464 family firms repre- 
sented in this sample.) 
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The ownership of a family firm generally passes 
through three broad stages of dispersion (Gersick et 
al., 1997): controlling owner, in which most shares 
are held by the founder, or in the case of later 
generations, by a single individual; the sibling part- 
nership, in which relatively equal proportions of 
ownership are held by members of a single gener- 
ation; and the cousin consortium, in which owner- 
ship is further fractionalized as it is passed on to 
include third and later generations. Although the 
conflicts that accompany each stage differ, the 
agency model that we describe below explains the 
conduct indigenous to each. 
Controlling Owner 
As we previously noted, in the principal-agent 
model, owners who manage a private (family or 
nonfamily) firm define its value in terms of their 
personal utility. Thus, they have powerful incen- 
tives to pursue options that they perceive as best 
and to bear the associated risks to the point where 
the marginal benefit received is offset by the threat 
the risks pose to their personal wealth (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Proponents of behavioral agency 
theory (e.g., Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) have 
refined that insight, arguing that the amount of risk 
that these owners are willing to bear is based, at 
least in part, on how they frame their expectations. 
For example, the owner-managers of private firms 
should have incentive to invest when they expect 
conditions in their firms' markets to grow, but not 
when they expect market growth to decline or slow. 
Lacking access to the equity markets, however, 
their ability to invest is limited by the availability 
of internally generated funds (Casson, 1991)-un- 
less, of course they take on or increase debt. It 
follows that the owner-managers of private firms 
will be more willing to use debt, and more willing 
to bear the threat it poses to their individual 
wealth, during periods of high market growth than 
they will during periods of decline or low market 
growth. 
We posit that parental altruism causes owners to 
pursue first-best actions when a private firm is fam- 
ily owned and is managed by a controlling owner.' 
Altruism is a trait that positively links the control- 
ling owner's welfare, as head of the family, to that 
of other family members (Schulze et al., 2001). 
Altruism thus compels the controlling owner to 
consider the needs of the firm and each family 
member when defining her or his first-best options 
(for instance, it may make the controlling owner 
more willing to pursue investments with longer- 
term payoffs). Over time, however, the economic 
incentive to do what maximizes personal utility 
can blur the controlling owner's perception of what 
is best for the firm or family; self-interest and the 
firm's and family's best interests may be viewed as 
one and the same in what we might call the "what's 
good for GM" phenomenon. For instance, age may 
cause the controlling owner to avoid investments 
that other family members favor because he or she 
views the investments as too risky or as personally 
threatening-in the case, perhaps, of their requiring 
the controlling owner to learn new skills. Conflicts 
of interest can therefore arise that give family mem- 
bers reason to question the extent to which they can 
rely on the controlling owner to make decisions 
that they deem as being in the family's best inter- 
ests. The family members thus have incentives to 
monitor the controlling owner and incur other 
agency costs in an effort to assure that their best 
interests are being served. 
Moreover, family members and controlling own- 
ers face different sets of incentives, and thus hold 
different views of what investments are best. 
For example, like their counterparts in public 
firms, family-member employees of family-owned 
and 
-managed firms bear only a fraction of the risk 
associated with an investment decision but, unlike 
their counterparts, are able to enjoy a dispropor- 
tionate share of the benefits owing to their family 
status. They are also likely to feel entitled to these 
benefits since, as family members, they believe that 
they own de facto options in the firms, or a residual 
but legitimate claim on them in the form of an 
inheritance at a future date (Holtz-Eakin et al., 
1993; Stark & Falk, 1998). 
This sense of entitlement has two important 
agency consequences. First, it can cause employed 
family members and their prospective heirs to be- 
come fiscally conservative, if not loss-averse, since 
added risk threatens the value of their anticipated 
inheritance. Put differently, an endowment effect 
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) engenders loss 
aversion by altering their risk-return calculus. Sec- 
ond, when the sense of entitlement is coupled with 
high exit costs and the perception that the potential 
cost of exiting a firm exceeds the expected value of 
other opportunities, hopeful family heirs can be- 
come locked into a dependent relationship with the 
firm. This makes it possible for a state of "double 
moral hazard" (Gupta & Romano, 1998) or "owner 
opportunism" (Perrow, 1986) to develop in which 
' First-best actions maximize a principal's expected 
utility subject to the constraint hat an agent receives his 
or her reservation utility (the utility the agent could 
receive by redeploying resources to their best alternative 
use). 
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the controlling owner has the power, and perhaps 
the incentive, to unilaterally change his or her es- 
tate plans, thereby placing family members' claims 
to the firm at risk.2 
Although double moral hazard ordinarily gives 
agents incentives to invest resources in monitoring 
a principal's conduct, family members' ability to 
influence a controlling family owner is constrained 
by both their minority (or even nonshareholder) 
status and the added authority controlling owners 
have by virtue of being the heads of the family 
households and, in many cases, the founders of the 
firms. These constraints, combined with the risk 
that the controlling owner may undertake invest- 
ments that other family members do not view as 
best, gives these family members incentive to prefer 
consumption to investment, and to do so (in the 
form of pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits) at 
rates that are high relative to their ownership 
stakes. Consumption, of course, precludes alterna- 
tive uses for the funds that are consumed. 
The net result is a pattern of incentives that is the 
reverse of that theorized to exist at widely held 
public firms. Whereas fractional ownership at 
widely held public firms gives insiders incentives 
to free ride on the outside owners equity, we argue 
that it gives family insiders (family-member direc- 
tors and employees) incentives to free ride on the 
controlling owner's equity. Controlling owners are 
likely to recognize that (some) family members are 
free riding on their (qua the family's) holdings. 
And, although altruism and the repercussions that 
disciplinary actions might have for family relations 
compels the controlling owners to accept this free 
riding, it also gives them incentive to be wary of the 
investment decisions that the family insiders might 
recommend. 
Thus, although we anticipate that the controlling 
owners of family firms, and especially founders, 
will initially have strong incentive to use debt to 
fund investments that they think are the best, we 
argue in the next section that their ability (and 
willingness to do so) will decline as the percentage 
of ownership held by loss-averse, consumption- 
oriented family members increases. 
Sibling Partnership 
The agency dynamics during the sibling partner- 
ship stage become more problematic. As in the 
controlling owner stage, the principal shareholder 
(that is, the largest shareholder) in a sibling part- 
nership is likely to serve as the CEO, to control the 
largest single block of ownership, and, by virtue of 
his or her office, to continue to wield influence that 
is disproportionate to ownership share. And, like a 
founder, the principal shareholder can be expected 
to fulfill a quasi-family-leader role, using the firm's 
resources to promote family welfare and to favor 
the reinvestment of earnings over the consumption 
of those earnings via dividends and other payments 
(Gersick et al., 1997). Yet typically, the principal 
shareholder in a sibling partnership is neither the 
founder of the family firm nor the biological head 
of the family and, lacking that authority and influ- 
ence over the siblings, is less able to obtain- 
whether by cooperation, co-option, or edict-the 
support of the other family directors for making 
investments and pursuing the opportunities that he 
or she believes to be the best options. 
In addition, and in line with both the family 
business literature (Gersick et al., 1997) and eco- 
nomic theory about altruism, all sibling partners 
are also likely to be more concerned about their 
own welfare and that of their immediate families 
than they will be about each other's welfare. (Ac- 
cording to this theory, a parent's concern for her or 
his children tends to be stronger than the children's 
concern for the parent [Stark & Falk, 1998], and 
altruistic ties among members of a nuclear family 
tend to be stronger than those among members of 
an extended family [Becker, 1981]). Thus, agency 
conditions in sibling partnerships resemble those 
in the controlling owner stage, with sibling part- 
ners having incentives to use a family-firm's re- 
sources to maximize their own utility; acting on 
these incentives can, again, engender double moral 
hazard problems and conflict between the sibling 
partners. 
The risk of intrafamily conflict is further exacer- 
bated as families age. Siblings who were once able 
to forge an effective partnership may find it torn 
apart as resource constraints force them to make 
hard decisions about dividend payout policy (to 
fund college tuitions, for instance) and/or the in- 
volvement of their adult children in the firm's op- 
erations. The risk of intrafirm conflict also rises if 
ownership is distributed somewhat equally among 
a principal shareholder and sibling partners. In this 
scenario, one loss-averse sibling can prevent others 
from putting a firm's resources to their desired 
(first-best) use. Consequently, we would expect sib- 
ling partners to have the incentive to engage in 
various political maneuvers, like vote swapping 
and "hostage taking," actions that might cause a 
series of compromises, ill-will, and second-best de- 
2 Witness the now famous case of the former Playboy 
model, Anna Nicole Smith, who inherited $475 million 
(reduced on legal appeal to $88 million) after a brief 
marriage to a septuagenarian husband, much to his chil- 
dren's dismay (Miller, 1999). 
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cisions about growth, investments in new technol- 
ogy, and so on. 
The result could be a state of paralysis in which 
no one sibling is willing to bear added risk or use 
debt to pursue opportunities that others believe are 
best. Thus, whereas the principal-agent model as- 
sumption is that increased ownership aligns the 
interests of rival parties, we posit that increased 
ownership dispersion among sibling partnerships 
will engender misalignment and loss aversion. Put 
differently, the increased concern for their own 
children, the added pressure from outside family 
directors (and in-laws) to sustain or enhance the 
rate of dividend payout, and the aging siblings' 
increasing reluctance to bear risk can cause a firm 
to reduce its use of debt, even when market condi- 
tions are perceived as favorable, and to get bogged 
down in the types of conflict that cause many fam- 
ily firms to flounder or fail (Levinson, 1971). 
Cousin Consortium 
Finally, we expect that the agency position of a 
principal and the minority owners will become 
more aligned in a family firm's cousin consortium 
stage. By the time the firm enters this stage, own- 
ership has become more dispersed, or fractional- 
ized, and it is less likely that a single individual 
owns a controlling or majority interest in the firm. 
This situation increases the degree of relative influ- 
ence that each family director has on the future 
value of his or her claim on the firm, thereby mit- 
igating the double moral hazard problem that char- 
acterized owner control and sibling partnership. 
Inside directors, it follows, should be less con- 
cerned with consumption and more concerned 
about the future value of their estates and how that 
value will be affected by any future dilution of 
ownership. The end result is an increase in the 
alignment of interest that exists among board mem- 
bers and, hence, reduced agency costs. 
In the cousin consortium stage of a family firm, 
ownership has likely passed to members of the 
extended family, the majority of whom are not em- 
ployed by the firm. All things being the same, these 
outside family members are less "overinvested" in 
the firm and, so, they should have risk preferences 
that are more akin to those of institutional investors 
and others who invest in public firms. We therefore 
anticipate that cousin consortiums' managers are 
both more willing to use debt to pursue their ob- 
jectives and, because of the dispersion of owner- 
ship, more able (and more likely) to bear that risk. 
It remains true, however, that because these firms 
are private (there is no liquid market for their 
shares), outside family owners can benefit from 
growth in earnings (through the payout of divi- 
dends), but not from growth in valuation. Conse- 
quently, during this ownership stage, most outside 
family shareholders will continue to favor con- 
sumption, while insiders (whose combined equity 
holdings usually represent the majority) will con- 
tinue to favor investment owing to their concern 
about the effect of further dilution on the value of 
their estates. Thus, the primary challenge facing the 
cousin consortium boards of family firms is to in- 
vest in growth while maintaining a dividend level 
that satisfies outside family owners (Gersick et al., 
1997). 
In summary, we anticipate that the dispersion of 
ownership that characterizes the cousin consor- 
tium stage engenders a coalition in which owner- 
ship brings the interests of the inside family direc- 
tors into alignment. We do not expect that this 
alignment will be as stable as it is for widely held 
public firms, because ownership is not as dispersed 
and the problems of market liquidity and exit costs 
remain. Nevertheless, we posit that for family firms 
in the cousin consortium stage, the greater the own- 
ership dispersion (and the smaller the average 
shareholding), the more likely their boards will be 
to favor growth and, in the absence of the ability to 
issue equity or cut dividends, the more likely they 
will be to risk the use of debt to fund growth. 
Hypotheses 
Taken together, our arguments support Morck 
and his coauthors' (1988) conjecture that disper- 
sion of ownership has a significant influence on 
board conduct. By extending their arguments to the 
domain of private family-owned and -managed 
firms, we hypothesize that family boards will be 
more willing to use debt when ownership is either 
concentrated in the hands of a controlling owner or 
dispersed into the hands of many owners (as in a 
cousin consortium), and less willing to use debt 
when ownership is split into relatively equal 
proportions (as in a sibling partnership). Stated 
formally: 
Hypothesis 1. The relationship between a fam- 
ily firm's use of debt and the dispersion of its 
ownership can be graphed as a U-shaped 
curve. 
In line with behavioral agency theory, we antic- 
ipate that a board's willingness to use debt varies 
with growth conditions in a family firm's market. 
All else being the same, we predict that family 
firms will increase borrowing during periods of 
high growth and, because of their dependence on 
internal cash flows and limited access to external 
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capital markets, will reduce it during periods of 
low growth (Wright et al., 1996). Accordingly, we 
tested our hypotheses under conditions of both 
high and low market growth rates, positing that the 
relationships stated in Hypothesis 1 will be sup- 
ported during periods of high growth, but not dur- 
ing periods of low growth. 
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between a fam- 
ily firm's use of debt and the dispersion of its 
ownership is moderated by the growth rate of 
the firm's market. 
METHODS 
Sample 
Reliable information on family firms is extremely 
difficult to obtain (Wortman, 1994). Public infor- 
mation is unreliable because most family firms are 
privately held and have no legal obligation to dis- 
close information. Government documents and 
Dunn and Bradstreet are also of little use because 
family-managed firms are not listed as a separate 
category of business organization. Finally, it is dif- 
ficult for researchers to collect primary data or to 
target selected groups of family-managed firms for 
study because there is no reliable way to identify 
family firms a priori (Daily & Dollinger, 1993). Con- 
sequently, researchers are forced to rely on self- 
reported data, sample from a broad population, and 
identify family-managed firms ex post (Daily & 
Dollinger, 1992, 1993; Handler, 1989). 
We field-tested our hypotheses using data from 
one of the largest and most comprehensive surveys 
ever conducted on family firms (Gersick et al., 
1997), a 1995 survey of American family businesses 
that was designed and administered by the Arthur 
Andersen Center for Family Business. Since all of 
the firms in the sample were privately held, and the 
data were confidential and proprietary, we were 
unable to independently establish the data's reli- 
ability. Andersen's statisticians assured us, how- 
ever, that they were reliable and representative of 
the population. 
While the use of secondary data can limit gener- 
alizability, Ilgen (1986) and Sackett and Larsen 
(1990: 435) pointed out that representativeness is 
less of a concern when a sample typifies the rele- 
vant population and the research question con- 
cerns whether the hypothesized effects can occur, 
as opposed to concerning the frequency or strength 
of observed effects. The Arthur Andersen data are 
well suited to this task because the survey was 
designed to obtain "reliable benchmarks" about 
American family businesses (Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 1995: 3). 
Before we mailed the survey to the chief execu- 
tives of 37,304 privately held U.S. family busi- 
nesses, we had the items in this survey reviewed by 
a focus group of family business owners and pilot- 
tested it on a hold-out sample. A single mailing 
yielded 3,860 responses within one month; this 
constitutes a response rate of 10.3 percent, which is 
comparable to "the 10-12 percent rate typical for 
studies which target executives in upper echelons" 
(Geletkanycz, 1997: 622; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & 
Fredrickson, 1993; Koch & McGrath, 1996) or chief 
executives in small to midsized firms (MacDougall 
& Robinson, 1990). 
Because of the a priori selection problems, 
Andersen survey respondents ranged from "mom 
and pop" proprietorships to large family-managed 
corporations. We therefore applied a number of ex 
post screening criteria to the data. First, we deleted 
334 partnerships and proprietorships because dif- 
ferent laws and tax policies influence their gover- 
nance. Second, we dropped 1,650 cases because 
data about firm ownership and/or board composi- 
tion were missing, and we dropped another 209 
because some information about the other 13 vari- 
ables included in the regression analyses was miss- 
ing. (We tested and found no differences in the use 
of debt or in the mean values of our model's inde- 
pendent variables between cases that included data 
about ownership or board composition and those 
that did not.) Finally, by deleting 203 firms that had 
$5 million or less in sales, we excluded "lifestyle 
firms" (small firms that might be operated mainly 
for the purpose of "income substitution" [Allen & 
Panian, 1982]); firms whose use of debt might be 
biased by their receiving subsidies;3 and others for 
which growth might not be a strategic objective 
(see, for example, Rubenson and Gupta [1996] and 
Carland, Hoy, Boulton, and Carland [1984], who 
also excluded these types of firms from samples, 
arguing that growth may not be among their strate- 
gic objectives). Larger firms are less likely to be 
operated in this manner since the demands of man- 
aging them mitigate a family's or a family CEO's 
primary motive for suppressing growth-to more 
easily maintain managerial and ownership control 
(Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Whisler, 1988). Thus, the 
final sample consisted of 1,464 firms. Our average 
firm had annual sales of $36 million, had 182 em- 
ployees, and had been in business for 49 years. 
3 For example, 95 percent of all loans guaranteed by 
the Small Business Administration go to firms with fewer 
than 50 employees (Small Business Administration, 
2002), a statistic that characterizes the firms in this sam- 
ple that had less than $5 million in annual sales. 
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Variables 
Dependent variable. We used debt as the depen- 
dent variable. As we previously discussed, the 
ownership structure of privately owned firms, un- 
like that of their public counterparts, does not al- 
low for unrestricted risk bearing via the issue of 
common stock. Capital investment is thus limited 
to that which can be supported by internally gen- 
erated funds and the shareholders' willingness to 
bear the risk that debt poses to their individual 
wealth (Casson, 1999). Although private ownership 
thus engenders fiscal conservatism, all else being 
the same, we deduce from a behavioral agency view 
that directors are willing to incur debt to pursue the 
investments that they perceive to be the best ones, 
particularly when the directors expect their firm's 
market to grow. 
Our variable measuring debt is a six-level indi- 
cator of a firm's debt-to-equity ratio; (from 1 to 6, 
codings were "no debt," "1-25%," "26-50%,"' 
"50-100%," "101-200%," and "over 200%"). The 
mean debt-to-equity ratio among our sample group 
of mature firms was 2.57, which interpolates to 
about 18 percent. The measure was self-reported 
and, as is the case with virtually all privately held 
firms, objective measures were not available. How- 
ever, performance measures reported by executives 
have been shown to be reliable (Nayyar, 1992; Tan 
& Litschert, 1994), particularly when reported on 
anonymous surveys (Dillman, 1978; Nunnally, 
1978). The impact of common method bias, which 
arises when a common method (such as a survey) is 
used to gather data about both independent and 
dependent variables, should also be less here than 
it might be for other types of studies because social 
desirability and other sources of bias are dimin- 
ished when variables are demographic, descriptive, 
and/or nonaffective, as are most of our variables 
(Crampton & Wagner, 1994). 
Covariates. We included nine covariates to re- 
duce variance that would be extraneous to the re- 
search question or that might confound interpreta- 
tion: firm size, firm age, multiple family ownership, 
number of family employees, exports as a percent- 
age of sales, information technology intensity, CEO 
tenure, average board tenure, board size, family 
ownership goal, and ownership held by the board. 
Each covariate is described and its use is justified 
in the Appendix. 
Independent variable. The mean percentage of 
shares controlled by the boards of the firms in our 
sample was 90 percent, and the largest shareholder 
controlled an average 52 percent of the votes (the 
largest shareholder was a sole owner in 18 percent 
of the cases). In contrast, the second through the 
fifth largest shareholders on the family-firm boards 
controlled, on the average, 25, 8, 3, and 1 percent of 
the votes. Interestingly, the remaining members 
about whom we had information (that is, the sixth 
through the eighth largest shareholders) together 
controlled barely half of 1 percent of the votes. 
Moreover, extreme variance in the shares held by 
these board members was indicated by standard 
deviations that ranged to values up to ten times the 
size of the mean. This distribution is not a surprise, 
given that only 166 firms in the sample had six or 
more board members, and 107 had seven or more. 
Following Tabachnick and Fidell (1989), we there- 
fore dropped these observations in our primary 
analyses of Hypotheses 1 and 2 and based our cal- 
culation of the independent variable, balance of 
voting power, on the total shares held by the five 
largest shareholders who served on a board. We 
also tested the sensitivity of our results by adding 
the shares held by the sixth largest shareholder, 
then the seventh, and then the eighth to the calcu- 
lation and repeating our tests; results are reported 
below. 
Balance of voting power was calculated as the 
sum of the squares of the minority board members' 
percentage share of votes divided by the square of 
the largest shareholder's percentage share of the 
votes. The sum of squares is used here like the 
Herfindal index, which economists use to describe 
the distribution of market share among industry 
participants: the sum of squares captures the effects 
of different distributions of ownership. Higher val- 
ues are associated with increased power held by 
individual shareholders, and lower values, with a 
more equal, and/or more diffuse dispersion of 
power on a board.4 The balance of voting power 
variable therefore captures the variance associated 
with changes in the dispersion of ownership that 
would not appear if the ratio were computed using 
a simple sum of each director's shareholdings. Val- 
ues of 1:1 or less indicated the distribution of own- 
ership favored the largest shareholder, and values 
higher than this indicated that the dispersion of 
ownership favored the minority shareholders. The 
dispersion of ownership favored the largest share- 
holder in 73 percent of our cases and favored mi- 
nority shareholders in the remaining 27 percent of 
the cases. 
Moderator. We used a dummy variable, industry 
sales growth, to test the proposition that investor 
expectations influence a family firm's use of debt. 
4 For example, a change in minority ownership disper- 
sion from 25:25 to 20:20:10 will cause the value of the 
numerator to fall from 1,250 to 900. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlationsa 
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Debt 2.56 1.45 
2. Firm size 37.44 121.71 .18 
3. Firm age 48.98 27.00 -.02 .10 
4. Multiple family ownership 0.91 0.29 .05 -.03 .01 
5. Number of family-member employees 3.43 2.03 .02 .09 .01 -.07 
6. Exports as a percentage of sales 1.51 0.82 .01 .07 .01 .00 -.03 
7. Information technology intensity 3.07 0.92 .08 .17 .06 .03 .00 .06 
8. Industry sales growth 0.52 0.50 .04 -.02 .08 -.01 .02 .24 -.02 
9. Ownership held by board 89.62 19.61 .01 -.15 -.16 .08 -.07 -.09 -.02 -.06 
10. CEO tenure 2.45 1.13 -.08 -.07 -.10 .02 .09 -.03 -.05 .00 .01 
11. Average board tenure 17.52 7.75 -.11 -.06 .13 -.03 .06 -.10 -.02 .00 .08 .13 
12. Board size 3.98 1.75 .04 .21 .22 -.05 .25 .08 .04 .08 -.23 -.04 -.20 
13. Family ownership goal 0.68 0.47 -.03 -.03 -.04 .07 -.04 -.05 .04 -.09 .12 .01 .03 -.09 
14. Balance of voting power 0.70 0.81 -.01 .02 .08 -.14 .27 -.03 .01 .02 .00 -.11 .06 .23 -.03 
a n = 1,464. Correlations larger than .04 are significant at p - .05. 
Since the industry categories identified in the 
Andersen survey do not correspond directly to SIC- 
based industry classifications, we coded industry 
sales growth 1 if the mean of the reported growth in 
sales for the industry category was greater than the 
median ratio for all industry categories, and we 
coded the variable 0 if mean growth was below the 
median. Although coarse-grained, this measure dis- 
tinguishes industries that enjoyed high levels of 
sales growth during this period (for instance, man- 
ufacturing and telecommunications) from those 
that did not. Further, we were unable to employ 
financial statistics derived from SIC-based data for 
control purposes since such data include informa- 
tion from large, widely held businesses whose mar- 
kets and capital structures differ markedly from 
those of family firms. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics (unstand- 
ardized) and Pearson correlations, and Tables 2 and 
3 report the results for all regression analyses. The 
change in explained variance (F) associated with 
the covariate set ranges from 3.52 (p s .001) to 7.17 
(p d .000), and the F-statistic associated with the 
set of hypothesized variables, after hierarchically 
adjusting for covariates, ranges from 6.54 (p .01) 
to 10.99 (p 5 .000).5 Hypothesis 1 was tested in 
both the full sample (Table 2) and in the two in- 
dustry (high and low industry growth) subsamples 
(Table 3). We used only the full sample to test 
Hypothesis 2. 
We used moderated hierarchical polynomial re- 
gression analysis to confirm that industry sales 
growth does, indeed, influence a family-owned 
and 
-managed firm's use of debt. In model 1 (Table 
2), centered variables (and their product terms) 
were entered hierarchically for both the balance of 
voting power and its square, and then, in the next 
step, the products of the independent variable and 
its square with industry sales growth were entered. 
As one would expect if the hypothesized relation- 
ships were nonlinear and moderated, the product 
of balance of voting power and industry sales 
growth (p 5 .009) was negatively associated with 
the use of debt, while the product of balance of 
voting power squared with industry sales growth 
was positively associated with the use of debt (p -< 
.001). The significance of the product terms indi- 
cates support for Hypothesis 2. In addition, and 
consistent with Hypothesis 1, the negative value of 
the first coefficient, combined with the positive 
sign of its square, suggests that the relationship is 
positively U-shaped over the relevant range. 
We then tested the sensitivity of these results by 
using the three alternative calculations of balance 
of voting power previously mentioned to test Hy- 
5 Overall, the regression models explain from 5 to 6 
percent of the variance in our dependent variable. These 
small effect sizes are likely the result in part (1) of the 
high heterogeneity the sample contained by virtue of its 
very large and diverse representation of firms and indus- 
tries and (2) of the categorical nature of the dependent 
variable. Cohen and Cohen (1980) noted, however, that 
an advantage of large samples is that they give analysts 
the ability to detect small effects with a high degree of 
confidence. Kraemer and Thiemann (1987: 105) esti- 
mated that the reliability or power of a sample to detect 
observed effect sizes is .80. 
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TABLE 2 
Results of Full-Sample Regression Analyses for Debt 
Variables 
Covariates 
Firm size 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
Firm age -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Multiple family ownership 0.06* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 
Number of family-member employees 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Exports as a percentage of sales -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Information technology intensity 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 0.05* 
Ownership held by board 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
CEO tenure -0.06* -0.07* -0.07* -0.06* 
Average board tenure -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
Board size -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Family ownership goal -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Industry sales growth 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* -0.01 
Predictors 
Balance of voting power -0.04 -0.04 0.05 
Balance of voting power squared 0.03 0.03 0.08 
Interactions 
Balance of voting power x industry sales growth -0.01 -0.14** 
Balance of voting power squared x industry sales growth 0.02*** 
R2 .05 
Adjusted R' .05 .05 .06 
F 7.17*** 6.23*** 5.84*** 6.19*** 
AF 0.36 0.10 10.99*** 
n 1,464 1,464 1,464 1,464 
*p 
- 
.05 
** ps .01 
S** p - .001 
potheses 1 and 2. All results (available on request) 
were correctly signed, and although their significance 
levels weakened incrementally as shareholders were 
added to the calculation, balance of voting power 
(p d .08)-but not its square-became marginally 
insignificant when calculated using information from 
all eight shareholders. Given the extreme variance 
associated with the addition of this information to the 
computation of the variable (previously discussed 
and reported), we concluded the results were not 
highly sensitive to its computation. 
Results of the subgroup analysis (Table 3, models 
2 and 3) lend further support to the hypotheses. 
The balance of voting power variable and its square 
are significant (p d .03 and p df .01, respectively) 
and correctly signed when industry sales growth is 
high, and are they insignificant when industry 
sales growth is low. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Family firms constitute over 80 percent of all 
business organizations in the United States and are 
the dominant form of economic enterprise through- 
out the world (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999), yet over two-thirds of first-genera- 
tion family firms do not survive to a second gener- 
ation of family ownership (Gersick et al., 1997). 
Understanding how the agency positions of the 
controlling owner and the minority shareholders 
influence the conduct of family firms is a small step 
toward understanding why many fail. In this arti- 
cle, we drew from behavioral and economic theo- 
ries to argue that the incentives facing the directors 
of privately held, family-managed firms are differ- 
ent from those facing the directors of widely held 
public firms. Whereas ownership is expected to 
align incentives in public firms, we found that how 
ownership is dispersed among the various family 
owners of a privately held firm affects such deci- 
sions as the use of debt. Our findings are therefore 
not only consistent with Morck and his colleagues' 
(1988) conjecture, but also suggest that the princi- 
pal-agent model requires modification before being 
applied to family firms. Furthermore, our findings 
about the moderating influence of industry growth 
are also consistent with the views of behavioral 
agency theorists like Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 
(1998), who pointed out that the amount of risk that 
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TABLE 3 
Results of Subsample Regression Analyses for Debt 
Variable Model 2: High Industry Growth Model 3: Low Industry Growth 
Covariates 
Firm size 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
Firm age -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Multiple family ownership 0.08* 0.08* 0.07* 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Number of family-member employees 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Exports as a percentage of sales -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Information technology intensity 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Ownership held by board 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.06 
CEO tenure -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
Average board tenure -0.10** -0.09** -0.09** -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* 
Board size -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Family ownership goal -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Predictors 
Balance of voting power -0.02 -0.12* -0.01 0.03 
Balance of voting power squared 0.13** -0.05 
R2 .05 .04 
Adjusted R2 .06 .06 .04 .04 
F 4.48*** 4.13*** 4.31*** 3.52*** 3.26*** 3.05*** 
AF 0.25 6.54** 0.77 0.35 
n 764 764 764 700 700 700 
* p 
- 
.05 
** p .01 
*** p .001 
owners will bear is a function of how they frame 
their expectations in terms of opportunities. 
Our story identifies two interesting de facto re- 
versals of incentives, patterns that diverge from 
predictions based on the conventional agency 
model. First, we argue that, whereas "blockhold- 
ing" in widely held public firms reduces the risk 
that insiders will free ride on outside owners' eq- 
uity, controlling ownership in a family firm (the 
counterpart of blockholding in public firms) can 
give family-member firm employees and directors 
the incentive to free ride on the controlling owner's 
equity. Second, we argued that, whereas the out- 
side shareholders in widely held public firms have 
the incentive to promote investment and growth- 
oriented risk taking, dispersion of ownership can 
give outside shareholders at private family firms 
the incentive to favor consumption. This story is 
also interesting from a theoretical perspective, 
since it identifies at least one population in which 
information about ownership dispersion, as well as 
ownership concentration, is needed to predict di- 
rector (and board) conduct. 
Results from our field study of 1,464 family firms 
support our hypotheses that their use of debt has a 
curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship to the disper- 
sion of ownership among voting members of their 
boards of directors, particularly during periods of 
market expansion. The nonlinear relationship sug- 
gests that family firms are most vulnerable to con- 
flict, and least willing to bear added risk, when 
ownership is split in relatively equal proportions. 
Interestingly, the fact that this distribution ap- 
peared in only 22 percent of our sample firms sug- 
gests that most family firm owners may take such 
risk into consideration when making their estate 
plans. This speculation is consistent with the views 
of Gersick and his coauthors (1997), who noted that 
successful sibling partnerships are rare because 
they are so difficult to manage and recommended 
that founders and controlling owners settle their 
estates in a manner that prevents the development 
of sibling partnerships. 
The purpose of our empirical tests, however, was 
to lend credibility to our theory, not to confirm its 
validity or determine the strengths of its effects. 
Indeed, we cannot claim that our tests were confir- 
matory since we used cross-sectional data and re- 
lied upon survey data gathered for other purposes. 
However, we think these tests lend credibility to 
our theory since the firms represented by the 
Andersen survey are typical of a population of 
firms that is rarely studied and whose data are 
difficult (and quite expensive) to obtain (Gersick et 
al., 1997: 25; Sackett & Larsen, 1990). The size of 
our sample also gave us sufficient power to detect 
small effects and yet conclude with a high degree of 
confidence that these results are not the product of 
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chance. Although some of the measures are coarser 
than we would have liked (for example, balance of 
voting power was computed from a simple sort of 
shareholdings by size, which captured only the 
average effects of ownership dispersion and its spe- 
cific effects), that coarseness also lends a conserva- 
tive bias to the analysis, since coarse measures de- 
flate variance and the likelihood of obtaining 
significant results (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). The 
fact that we obtained significant results, despite the 
type of measures used and the presence of nine 
control variables, suggests that these results are 
robust. Future research must, however, address 
these weaknesses through use of more appropriate 
survey research methodology and finer-grained 
measures. 
The effect of ownership dispersion on goal align- 
ment within family-firm boards is a complex issue, 
and this study investigates only one of its aspects. 
Future studies might examine the relationship be- 
tween minority shareholder influence and the dis- 
persion of ownership among minority members. 
We suspect that a relatively equal distribution of 
ownership among fewer minority owners promotes 
a more stable coalition that would be more able to 
influence firm conduct. Future studies might also 
examine whether the severity of the double moral 
hazard problem varies with ownership stage. We 
suspect that this problem is more likely to manifest 
itself under a controlling owner than under a sib- 
ling partnership. We also suspect that this problem 
may be more common when family firms are 
owned by more than one family than when differ- 
ent branches of the same family compete on the 
boards and for the firms' resources. 
Future studies might examine whether our hy- 
potheses apply without modification to family- 
controlled public firms. At what level of ownership 
and control might the controlling owners' concern 
for family welfare start to generate agency costs for 
outside shareholders? Are double agency problems, 
or the allegiance of a CEO to both stockholders 
and family, more problematic in public owner- 
controlled firms (like Microsoft), sibling partner- 
ships (such as Wal-Mart), or cousin consortiums 
(like the Ford Motor Company)? And what is the 
effect of family ownership on the outside owners' 
agency costs? (The recent proxy fight at Hewlett- 
Packard over a proposed merger with Compaq 
Computer is one case germane to this question.) 
These and other interesting questions that can 
enrich corporate governance theory remain. Our 
study represents an early attempt to pinpoint the 
dynamics of ownership and control in family firms. 
By showing that the dispersion of ownership influ- 
ences family firms' use of debt, we provided a long 
overdue response to Morck and colleagues' (1988) 
call for research, while at the same time revealing 
information about an economically important pop- 
ulation of firms that has been largely neglected by 
researchers. 
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APPENDIX 
Nine covariates were included to reduce extraneous or 
confounding variance. Firm size was total firm sales log- 
arithmically transformed to correct for its skewed distri- 
bution. Firm age was calibrated in years. Age may be 
linked to performance via a self-selection bias; older 
firms existed in this sample simply because they were 
successful. Multiple family ownership was a dummy 
variable (0/1) that adjusted for the influence of multiple 
families owning at least 15 percent of a firm's stock. We 
also controlled for the number offamily-member employ- 
ees since employment risk rises as families become de- 
pendent on a firm for their livelihood. The mean number 
of family employees for our sample was 3.51; the range 
was 1-24. Exports as a percentage of sales was a five- 
level indicator ranging from "zero" through "over 50 
percent." In general, firms with export sales report a 
higher level of indebtedness because they use bank let- 
ters of credit and other types of debt instruments to 
facilitate payment from international customers. Vari- 
ance in performance and agency conditions linked to 
information technology intensity was controlled by using 
this item: "How important are investments in informa- 
tion technology for the accomplishment of your future 
goals?" (1 = "not important," 4 = "very important"). 
We also controlled for CEO tenure, average board ten- 
ure, and board size. A large body of managerial research 
indicates that long CEO tenure is generally detrimental to 
firm performance (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Indi- 
vidual risk tolerance falls with age, and cognitive pro- 
cesses rigidify. For example, Hambrick and Fukutomi 
(1991) observed that as managers age, they tend to re- 
ceive narrower and more filtered information, acquire 
task knowledge more slowly, lose interest in routine 
tasks as repetition leads to tedium, and increase their 
commitment to the status quo (Hambrick et al., 1993). 
The negative effects of age and tenure on both cognitive 
diversity and risk tolerance are exacerbated by group 
processes (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996: 124-130). The 
Andersen survey from which we drew data measured 
CEO tenure with a five-level variable with responses 
ranging from "11 or more years until retirement" to 
"semiretired." We found that this indirect measure of 
tenure correlated with other indirect measures of tenure 
available from the survey. For example, the bivariate 
correlation between CEO tenure and CEO age was high 
(r = .62, p 
- 
.001), particularly given that scaling differ- 
ences naturally deflated the correlation between the two 
variables. Also, the mean age of the CEOs (54 years) and 
the mean age of the heirs-apparent at the time of this 
designation (38 years) differed, as we expected, by about 
one generation. Like Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), 
we measured average board tenure as the average of the 
years members had served and controlled for variance in 
the number of board members across firms with a count 
indicating board size. The mean board size in this sample 
was 3.98, and the standard deviation was 1.74. An item 
that asked the respondents to rate the likelihood that 
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their families would retain control of the sampled firms 
in the foreseeable future, family ownership goal, con- 
trolled for variance in the strategic directions of these 
family firms. Lastly, we measured ownership held by 
board as the percentage of a firm's shares held by mem- 
bers of its board of directors. 
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